

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AND AIR FORCE
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JAPANESE WAR PRODUCTION INDUSTRIES

PART III

Motor Vehicle and Tank Industry

Description

Discussion of the Japanese motor vehicle and tank industry; corporate structure and the history of governmental control receive the major emphasis. The capacity and technological aspects of this industry are also discussed.

31 October 1945

RESTRICTED

III. MOTOR VEHICLE AND TRUCK INDUSTRY

1. Production: Physical and Technical Aspects

1. General Background.

The Japanese motor vehicle industry, virtually non-existent prior to 1936, is still extremely small by western standards. Its aggregate capacity has been assessed at from 70,000 to 90,000 vehicles of all types per year. If trucks alone were produced, as recent intelligence suggested, Japanese annual motor vehicle manufacturing capacity was probably of the order of 70,000 one and one-half ton or larger vehicles in 1944. Output for that year was estimated at 15,000 motor trucks. The motor vehicle industry is estimated to have had a capacity of about 3,000 tanks annually (1 January 1945), but no more than 400 tanks were estimated to have been produced in 1944. In spite of considerable conversion of its facilities to higher priority production, the industry apparently was able to fulfill all essential wartime requirements. The Army's losses in combat were small, gains by conquest substantial, and domestic truck requirements negligible. Shortage of fuel and repair parts prevented trucks from securing an important position in industrial transport.

The automobile industry was probably the most backward branch of the metal and machinery group in the country in 1936, and the total number of motor vehicles in use was only 134,094. Nevertheless it had made considerable strides since 1929.

The 1930s production was not only small quantitatively but poor in quality. About two-thirds of the domestic production consisted of small "run-arounds", such as the "Datsun" passenger car. Over 50 percent of autos, engines, and parts were imported from the U.S. as late as 1934. At the same time, the American companies also developed the habit of introducing blueprints into Japan and contracting with various Japanese producers to manufacture spare parts and components. (See Appendix IIIA for a list of component producers who did business with Ford in Japan.)

Tank production was so small as to represent little drain on truck component or assembly facilities. In the year 1944, it is estimated that Japan produced in addition to trucks and tanks, 10,000 motorcycles, 800 trailers, and 200 tractors. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the growth of production for trucks and automobiles respectively. The former table also attempts to show the over-all truck position as well as give production data for recent times. The latter table is of historical interest only.

In order to achieve her 1944 level of vehicle production, Japan was devoting a labor force of about 150,000 to that field. (See R & A 2271, Industrial Distribution of the Population of Japan.)

2. Importance to the Military.

a. Military Encouragement. The approach of the Japanese to the establishment of a native automotive industry was not based upon economics but upon the opinion of the Japanese Government that reasons of national defense required such a step regardless of the cost. National pride was also

involved. Automobiles were considered an indispensable necessity for the expanding military forces. The Japanese Army was the most influential

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Table 4.
TOTAL STOCK POSITION
JAPANESE CONTROLLED TERRITORY

(In thousands of vehicles)

Year	Registrations (as of 1 Jan)	New Production	Imports	Acquired in Occupied Territory	Wastage
1929	23.4	.2	14.3	--*	10.3
1930	27.6	.4	10.0	--*	5.4
1931	32.6	.5	9.1	--*	6.7
1932	35.5	.7	6.6	--*	6.2
1933	36.6	1.6	7.3	--*	6.2
1934	39.3	1.9	13.9	--*	10.2
1935	44.9	1.8	13.8	--*	6.8
1936	51.9	3.0	13.8	--*	8.6
1937	60.1	5.0	16.3	5.0	6.5
1938	79.9	8.0	12.7	5.0	22.2
1939	83.4	15.0	10.9	5.0	17.4
1940	96.9	20.0	.8	4.0	10.5
1941	111.2	15.0	--*	12.7	15.8
1942	123.1	20.0	--*	50.2	26.0
1943	167.3	20.0	--*	1.0	25.9
1944	159.4	15.0			

*Less than 500 vehicles

Table 5.
GROWTH OF THE JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
1929-1936

Year	Domestic Production	Cars Imported or Assembled from Imported Parts	Assembled from Im- ported Parts.
1929	437	29,338	--
1930	458	19,678	--
1931	434	20,109	--
1932	810	14,057	13,853
1933	1,612	15,082	14,373
1934	2,701	33,458	29,689
1935	5,355	30,787	27,021
1936 (est.)	9,633	30,997	--

and insistent supporter of the government policy in promoting a purely Japanese automotive industry. It insisted that Japan be independent of all foreign makers of trucks. With the aid of a heavy government subsidy, increased import duties, and restricted operations on the part of foreign motor car manufacturers, a domestic automobile industry was established, and two firms were charged with the objective of turning out some 60,000 cars and trucks annually by about 1942. The military, who constituted the only group of consumers in Japan that preferred Japanese-made cars to reliance upon any foreign source of supply, were not interested in passenger cars; they were not interested in any export market; they were not interested in style changes or appearance of the truck. They considered the matter purely from the point of view of military necessity in its most restricted sense.

b. Government Subsidy and Tariffs. Automobiles manufactured in Japan could hardly have been sold without government assistance. Trucks manufactured by military authorities were produced on the basis of government subsidy, the government buying most of the output and subsidizing private business concerns into buying the rest. For example, in the immediate pre-war period, the government provided a subsidy of ¥300 per military motor truck of the six-wheel, one and one-half metric ton type. It cost about ¥3,000 for the Japanese producer to make a standard size car for the small pre-war Japanese market. The Toyoda truck, which is a combination of the parts of three American cars, was sold to the general public for ¥4,500. According to Japanese sources, it was sold at a loss of ¥3,500. As a result of this cost position, and ignoring differences in quality, it is obvious that free competition with the American

producer was impossible. Indeed, import duties for 1938 were equivalent to approximately 49 percent ad valorem on both cars and parts.

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c. Military Dependence on Motor Vehicles. On the whole the Japanese military forces were relatively less dependent on tanks and motor vehicles than those of the United States or any of the major European powers. Comparative T.O. requirements indicated that in the year 1943 Japanese armored divisions contained approximately one-fifth as many tanks as U.S. armored divisions and slightly more than a third as many tanks as the German and British armored divisions. T.O. requirements for Japanese infantry divisions were correspondingly low. While a German division (15,379 men) had 1,122 cars and trucks and 358 motorcycles, a Japanese infantry division (20,000 men) had only 60 cars and trucks and 20 motorcycles. It is evident, therefore, that the Japanese motor vehicle and tank equipment was far below the scale of other powers. Table 6 indicates the estimated holdings of the Japanese Army for vehicles of various types.

TABLE 6.
ESTIMATED EQUIPMENT STRENGTH OF JAPANESE FORCES
(1 January 1945)

	No. in hands of organized divisions	GHQ reserves as % of front- line strength	Total
Light Tanks	4,000	10	4,400
Medium Tanks	2,500	10	2,750
Armored Cars	300	10	330
Motor Trucks	70,000	15	80,500

3. Importance to the Industrial Economy. Japan has always been much less dependent on motor vehicles for transportation than any of the western countries. At the beginning of 1938, for example, Japan had on the average only one truck or bus for 700 people as against one for 38 people in the United States, 81 people in the United Kingdom, and 186 in Germany. Even Italy and the USSR ranking next lowest to Japan, had about twice as many trucks or busses per capita.

The Japanese rely for transportation primarily on their excellent railroad system and water-borne conveyances. In certain parts of Japan, human and animal carriage is extensively utilized. Moreover, the available motor vehicles are intensively utilized and, by American standards, heavily overloaded. This reliance on rail and ship transport is in part due to the several following economic factors.

a. Restricted Internal Market. Instances of Japan's disadvantageous cost position could be applied to the manufacture not only of the standard size American-type car but also to manufacture of the Datsun or midget cars. Practically speaking, there was no foreign competitor of the Japanese midget car in the Japanese market. The English Baby Austin and English Baby Ford sold a few units, and they were far superior in quality to the Datsun. But the Japanese people did not take readily to a midget car even when it was priced as low as the Datsun. It would have had to be sold for considerably under ¥ 1,000 to find a substantially larger market, and this would probably result in a loss of ¥ 2,000 or more per unit to the manufacturer. The small output of the Japanese automobile factories is, in turn, the principal cause of the high cost of production.

b. Labor, Materials, and Machine Tool Costs. The labor cost is the only factor which favors Japan in the production of automobiles. Materials, nearly all of which are imported, and machine tools, which until very recently were likewise imported, are more expensive in Japan than in the United States. This was probably true even under the law of 1936 for promoting the Japanese automotive industry, which decreased the cost of materials and machine tools by exempting them from payment of import tariffs. In the past, Japanese producers in addition have not invested heavily in the costly special machine tools which are an important feature of American automobile plants. This fact has made the relative cost of plant equipment lower, but has likewise reduced the mechanical efficiency of the plant. There remains the question of whether Japanese labor and relatively elementary machine tools can reduce the cost of production to a point where Japanese manufacturers can operate on a paying basis in a free market situation.

c. Japanese Use of American Techniques. In offsetting subsidiary question concerns patent infringements by Japanese producers through the wholesale copying of American automobiles. In the past, whenever the Japanese automobile manufacturers wished to patent a feature belonging to an American car, the Japanese Patent Law seemed to have been complied with if public notice of the application for a patent were given in an obscure newspaper published in a distant part of the country where there were no foreigners who were likely to be able to read Japanese. In a matter which was admittedly so vital to the Japanese Government, patent restrictions were never permitted to interfere

4. Technological Aspects.

a. Tool Capacity. Basic manufacturing processes in the automotive field are light and medium engineering manufacturing processes largely dependent on precision machine tools, heavy presses, and forges. Japan was in the habit of importing the bulk of her specialized and precision tools, largely from the United States, but in the past few years, including the war period, she made a marked and resourceful effort to become self-sufficient in most machine tool lines. It is probable that the recently developed and reasonably adequate machine tool capacity of Japan could in a few months replace even such special and critical tools as cylinder block machines, heavy crankshaft lathes and grinders, gear-cutters, hobbers, grinders, hammers, presses, and auxiliary equipment for forgings and stampings.

What has been said of motor vehicles is also true of tanks. Much of the equipment in tank plants consists of large machine tools, the manufacture of which requires a long time; however, given her present machine tool capacity, Japan could probably retool her present plants in a year. It must also be remembered that a large part of the facilities used in the production of heavy machinery, locomotives, other railway equipment, and tanks is interchangeable.

The manufacture of motorcycles and three-wheelers requires little specialized equipment. If plants were dismantled, production could probably be dispersed to many small shops equipped with standard light machine tools.

5. Principal Raw Materials.

a. Supply. Until very recently most of the raw materials for Japan's automotive industry had to be partially or entirely imported from foreign countries. These materials included such essentials as magnesium, nickel, pig iron, special steels, aluminum, raw cotton, and rubber. It is understood that fairly heavy stocks of some of these materials were being held in reserve for some time. Most of the supplies of nickel were obtained either directly or indirectly from Canada. Germany normally furnished a large proportion of the special steels. In 1938 Japan imported 70 percent of her rubber from British Malaya; most of the remainder was supplied by the Netherlands East Indies and British Borneo.

Although, because of wartime conditions, Japan may have originally found herself in difficulties for the lack of essential raw materials -- particularly high-grade alloy steels necessary in the manufacture of such critical automotive parts as crank-shafts, cam shafts, etc. --

she clearly contrived to improve her situation during the wartime period by development of new installations and techniques and by widespread use of substitute materials. * *

b. Iron and Steel. Before the war, Japan depended on imported iron ore for 80-90 percent of her ore consumption. The bulk of her scrap needs were also imported, mainly from the United States. During the war her iron and steel industry depended almost entirely on iron ore and coking coal mined on the continent. In 1943 Manchuria, Korea, the Philippines, and Malaya supplied her with the required ore, in that order of importance. Estimates place the effective capacity of the steel producing plants in Japan proper in 1944 at about 12,000,000 metric tons, but capacity always far exceeded output -- so much so that in 1944 output was placed by the Japanese themselves at no more than 2,000,000 metric tons, with a further marked decrease for the first quarter of 1945. Shipping difficulties and air raids were primarily responsible for this trend. Great as this disparity between capacity and production in 1944 may appear, in actuality the 1944 figure (2,000,000 metric tons) is not far from Japan's total pre-war industrial requirements for steel (3,000,000 metric tons).

Of the four or five million metric tons of pig and approximately equal tonnage of rolled and forged products which were produced in Japan in 1943, about 225,000 metric tons, or less than 6 percent, was allotted to the production of motor vehicles and tanks.

(i) Regional Concentration. The iron and steel industry was heavily concentrated in a few important districts (Tokyo, Yokohama, Tobata, Yawata, and Anshan, Manchuria). Ten localities account for 86 percent of pig iron capacity, 94 percent of steel capacity, and 98 percent of rolled products. The industry is characterized by a few large integrated plants and a host of small plants. The three largest plants account for 30.5 percent of pig iron capacity, 38.2 percent of steel capacity, and 31 percent of rolled steel products. (See Appendix IIIB).

(ii) Alternative Domestic Processes. Despite claims for iron sands, it is not believed that these resources are of major quantitative significance in the light of the technological difficulties involved in producing iron of an analysis suitable for steel making. Some iron was made from iron sands by a number of small domestic producers. However, only 250,000 tons of ore are attributed to this source, or enough to produce about 100,000 tons of rolled products. Even such limited success may be an indication of possible future developments along these lines, however.

(iii) Stock piles. It is not likely that any substantial stock piles of semi-finished steel products existed in Japan at the war's end; accordingly, if production exceeded consumption at any period during the war, stock piles would most likely be in end products. Stocks of pig iron would be determined by the flow of iron ore and by the consumption of steel furnaces. Because of the crisis in Japan's shipping, probably no stocks existed in Japan at the war's end sufficient to carry over an extended interruption of supplies.

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Moreover, in order to feed her capacity, it has been necessary for Japan to draw heavily on the limited iron ore resources of Manchuria, China, Korea, Philippines, and Malaya. The iron and steel industry of Japan has from the outset been one of the most heavily subsidized industries in Japan ever², primarily because both coking coal and the ores have had to be imported and the

2. Subsidies for the steel industry in Japan for the years 1937-1943 inclusive totalled ¥ 353,395,000. The coal industry during the same period received ¥ 790,928,000.

nearest ores available in the Far East are predominantly low-grade ores averaging 35 to 45 percent in iron content.

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6. Structure of the Motor Vehicle Industry. Japan's motor vehicle industry, like her aircraft industry, draws on a very large number of plants for the various components required. However, automotive production as such is concentrated in five or six principal plants. In the case of tanks and large military tractors, only one army arsenal¹ and a small number of private plants have been definitely identified as producers. Those plants which on the basis of indirect evidence, have been credited with the capacity for tank production are restricted to the small number of nine or ten, while the bulk of the production capacity has been allocated to four of the largest. Although there are eleven known makers of motorcycles and three-wheelers ("sanrishas"), six plants account for about 75 percent of the capacity. (See Appendix IIIc for list of plants producing trucks, military tractors, tanks, and other vehicles, their capacities and locations; see also Map II.) Finally the production of tires is also highly concentrated; three plants in Japan and one in Java accounted for over four-fifths of the total in Japanese controlled territories. (See Appendix IIIId.).

1. Sagami Arsenal

B. Organization of the Motor Vehicle and Tank Industry.

1. Brief History. The history of the automotive industry in Japan is a chronicle of military encouragement, government subsidy, and preferential legislation to establish an industry which was considered essential to national self-sufficiency, prestige, and military efficiency.

As early as 1918, motor car manufacture in Japan was encouraged by means of military subsidies to producers of trucks. In 1931 a committee was established to study the firm establishment of the automobile industry in Japan. In 1934 an interdepartmental conference was established, composed of officials of the Ministries of War, Navy, Railways, Home Affairs, Commerce and Industry, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Overseas Affairs, and of the Resources Bureau of the Cabinet, to discuss measures for the establishment of a national policy for the automobile industry. This interdepartmental conference compiled the basic plan, announced on 9 August 1935, for the control of the industry and worked out the draft of the Automobile Industry Control Law which was approved by the Cabinet on 23 April 1936. This law sought to freeze the expansion of foreign-controlled manufacturing interests and placed importations on a rigid quota basis. It also licensed certain Japanese companies for exclusive manufacture. In return for government supervision over production, licensed companies received a number of outstanding privileges, not the least of which was a practical monopoly of the Japanese motor vehicle industry. (See

Appendix IIIe for full text as published in the Official Gazette, 29 May 1936.) The essential features of this draft Law, as cited by the Japanese, are as follows:

a. Automobile Industry Control Law

(i) Purpose of the Law.

The purpose of the law is firmly to establish the motor car manufacturing industry in Japan with a view to attaining completion of the national defense and to achieve industrial development.

(ii) License System.

(a) A license must be held by everyone who assembles motor cars which are designated by order of the Government and everyone who manufactures automobile parts which are designated by the Government, in excess of a certain limit to be fixed by the Government.

(b) Everyone who receives such a license from the Government must be a joint stock company formed under the laws of Japan, and half or more of the total stock shares and voting privileges in the said company must be in the possession of the Japanese subjects or of companies organized under the laws of Japan.

(iii) Privileges.

(a) Companies to which licenses are granted shall be exempted from certain classes of taxes for a certain period.

(b) Special provisions will be made in the Commercial Codes in order that facilities may be offered to automobile manufacturing companies in regard to increases of capital and the floating of debentures.

(iv) Protection of Public Interests.

(a) The Government is authorized to issue to the automobile manufacturing companies, whenever necessary, such orders as are deemed necessary for supervision of the industry and for promotion of the public welfare.

(b) The Government is authorized to issue such orders as are deemed necessary for the national defense.

(v) Regulations Governing Importation of Automobiles and Parts.

When the prices of imported automobiles and imported automobile parts are considered sufficiently low to have a harmful effect upon the growth of the automobile manufacturing industry in this country, the Government may restrict the importation of, and impose higher import duties on, the said automobiles and parts thereof.

(vi) Automobile Manufacturing Industry Commission.

An Automobile Manufacturing Industry Commission shall be organized to consider matters relating to licenses for automobile manufacturing companies and to the enforcement of this law.

(vii) Retroactive Provision.

Those persons who began the automobile manufacturing business, as defined in this law, prior to 9 August 1935, and who are still engaged in the same business at the time of enforcement of this law, will be permitted to continue such business without holding the aforementioned license but within the limit of their business as it existed prior to 9 August 1935.

(viii) Review of the Industry Before 1936.

By virtue of the Automobile Industry Control Law, the manufacturing and assembling of motor cars was made subject to government license. The principal licensees under this law were Nissan Jidosha Seizo K.K. (Nissan Automobile Company) at Yokohama and Toyoda Jidosha Kogyo K.K. (Toyoda Motor Car Company) at Moromo (Aichi Prefecture). Both were licensed by the government as mass production manufacturers of so-called popular type cars and trucks. Each of these plants before the war was licensed to manufacture 13,500 units per year.

At the same time Ford was given a production quota of 12,360 cars per annum, and General Motors was given a quota of 9,470.

These quotas were based on average production during the three preceding years. Under the quotas either passenger cars or trucks could be imported. After the end of 1938, however, no passenger cars could be imported commercially or manufactured. Most of the American trucks imported were sold to the Japanese military authorities.

In keeping with their projected program and as a result of the success of the Nissan and Toyoda developments and the lack of foreign exchange, the Japanese authorities progressively reduced the issuance of import permits to the two American assembly plants. By 1939 General Motors was practically out of production; Ford was operating at a much reduced rate, and was forced to close down at the end of February 1940.

In February or March 1942 the Japanese took over the Ford plant at Yokohama to ship all of its equipment to Antung, Manchuria, presumably to be used by Manshu Jidosha K.K.

(Manchurian Automobile Company¹). The plant itself was occupied by the Mitsubishi Company, and Diesel motors for large-sized boats and submarines were produced in this former Ford plant. Similarly it is rumored that the equipment of the General Motors assembly plant at Osaka was removed and shipped to Toyoda Jidosha.* It is not certain whether the equipment was shipped to its new plant at Koromo or to its old plant at Lagoya.

2. National Policy Companies.

As a result of the lack of success experienced by various firms in the production of Diesel cars, the authorities decided in January 1941 that one manufacturer should be designated as a "national policy company" for this type of vehicle. This designation means, as a rule, that the companies so chosen are exempt from income, excess profits, and local taxes for a term of years and are the recipients of government subsidies or are permitted to issue bonds up to several times the paid-up capital with principal and interest guaranteed. On the other hand, the government supervises organization, output, distribution and prices in varying degrees.

After a series of conferences with producers and the military, it was decided in March 1941 that the Tokyo Jidosha Kogyo K.K. (Tokyo Automobile Industry Company) should be selected as the sole manufacturer of Diesels, and that the trucks to be turned out should consist of 5,000 c.c. and 8,000 c.c. types. After being designated on 9 April, Tokyo Jidosha agreed to change its name to the Diesel Jidosha Kogyo K.K. (Diesel Automobile Industry Company). The Nissan and Toyoda concerns had received similar designations in 1936 under the Automobile Industry Control Law for the manufacture of gasoline-driven automobiles.

1. Another report refers to it as reorganized by Diesel Jidosha.
*. Also reported shipped to the Antung plant of Manshu Jidosha.

C. Administration1. Munitions Ministry.

Prior to the end of 1943, government supervision of the motor vehicle industry was carried out by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. However, with the formation of the Ministry of Munitions (Gunju-sho) in November 1943, which, took over the functions of the aforementioned Ministry of Commerce and Industry, among others, it may be assumed that general jurisdiction over the motor vehicle industry fell into its sphere. This seems even more likely since control over production of motor vehicles was specifically excluded from the functions of the new Ministry of Transportation and Communications (Unyu-Tsushin-sho) established at the same time. The Army Ordnance Headquarters and the various army arsenals retained jurisdiction over production of tanks and armored vehicles in their own plants or plants administered directly through them. But general production schedules for the motor vehicle industry emanated from a bureau of the Munitions Ministry, and were administered by the particular semi-official trade organizations involved.

In line with the complete reorganization of transport which was undertaken by the Japanese administration in the early summer of 1945, control over motor and other "small freight transport" was handed over to the Army Ordnance Headquarters (of the War Ministry) by the Ministries of Transport and Munitions. This control extended to the actual production and maintenance of motor vehicles. (See Chart 5.)

2. Auto Control Society (Jidosha Tosaiikai): Semi-Official Cartel.

In the case of the motor vehicle industry, the organization which carries out the details of production, such as allocation of raw materials and orders, is the Automobile Control Society, established in accordance with the Major Industry Association Ordinance of 1 September, 1941. In line with this ordinance, such matters as the production of automobiles, their distribution, production of accessories, and maintenance were placed under one responsible body. The new organization also succeeded the Nippon Jidosha Seizo Kogyo Kumiai (Japan Automobile Manufacturing Association) and presumably the Zenkoku Jidosha Bubunhin Kogyo Kumiai Kengokai (Federation of Automobile Parts and Accessories Industry Associations in Japan Proper), which formerly together controlled the production and distribution of autos, their parts, and accessories in Japan and the Southern Areas. Through these channels all designated manufacturers were given quotas for the production of each type of part on a quarterly basis.

The Automobile Control Society was divided into six departments. The name of each, in general, indicates the function:

- (a) General Affairs.
- (b) Planning.
- (c) Production.
- (d) Distribution.
- (e) Technical.
- (f) Standards and Specifications.

Its official character was supplied by appointment of high ranking military officers and bureaucrats to top executive positions; most of

The Directors, however, were members of the industry. Thus its President was Lt. General SUZUKI, Shigeyasu, former diplomat and General Staff member, and its Managing Director was SUZUKI Hideo, formerly a Section Chief of the Fuel Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and more recently director of the Osaka Mine Superintendence Bureau. Among the Directors was OKANO Lizo, a Director of Toyoda Jidosha.

To the Automobile Control Society there was appended a Council. The following is the list of councilors and the companies to which they belong:

TOYODA Kiichiro, President of Toyoda Jidosha
MURAKAMI, Masasuni, President of Nissan Jidosha
HAYASHI, Katsura, of Diesel Jidosha
SHIMODA Bungo, Managing Director of Kawasaki Sharyo
YAMAMOTO Soji, President of Hanshu Jidosha & Director of Nissan Jidosha
ASAHARA, Gennichi, Managing Director of Nissan Jidosha
TIRADA Jinkuchi of Nippon Mainenki (Japanese Internal Combustion)
NONAGASI Tadao of Sharin Kogyo (Wheel Industry)
MACHINO Ryoza of Tire Kogyo Kumiai (Tire Industry Association)

Three professors of Tokyo Imperial University -- TANAKA Yoshio, TAKAMURU Jingo, and MISHIMATA Tokohichi -- were also included among the councilors. The inspectors for the Automobile Control Society also came from major firms. They were AKAI Hisayoshi of Toyoda Jidosha and YAMADA Kinichi of Nissan Jidosha.

The society was organized to do the following things: increase production; mobilize materials; examine reports of manufacture and production and the relation of raw material supplies to production

quotas of individual members; make appropriate manpower allocation and dispose of requests for increased capitalization. It also established a Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere Automobile Enterprise. With Japan, Manchuria, China, and the Southern Areas, as a nucleus, a fundamental plan for production of raw materials and distribution in various localities was set up. The enterprise studied production plans for each branch of the industry. It established the amount of material and facilities necessary for increased production; and conducted research into the management, scale, and operational methods of the automobile industry.

* * * * *

The Manchukuo Government followed the principle of one company for each industry and established special or semi-special concerns for the development of the industries and resources of each region. With the successive discoveries of various important industrial resources in recent times, the Government, realizing the need for integrating the various so-called "Control Companies", and of affecting coordinated development of such resources, had the Nippon Sangyo K.K. (Nippon Industrial Company -- Nissan), a successful Japanese combine, transferred to Manchuria on 27 December 1937, and re-incorporated it into the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation, a Manchukuo special juridical person, capitalized at 450,000,000 yuan (1940), of which one-half was subscribed by the Government. The aggregate authorized capital of the Mangyo's affiliated concerns at the end of January 1940 was 885,000,000 yuan of which 731,850,000 yuan was paid up.

This new company with its head office in Hsinking, was governed by the Law for the Supervision of the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation (20 December 1937, by Imperial Ordinance No. 460). Among other regulations, the law provided that the Government guarantee the company certain returns equivalent to 6 percent dividend on all investments made in the Manchurian enterprise for a period of ten years after its establishment. As an executive organ of the Government in heavy industrial fields, the Mangyo, as this company was popularly called, managed and directed the iron and steel industry, light metals manufacturing,

automobile manufacturing, aircraft manufacturing, and coal mining, and perhaps also invested in gold, zinc, lead, copper, and other mining industries, as well as in other enterprises at home and abroad, on permission of the Ministers concerned. Thus in line with the execution of the Manchurian Five Year Industrial Plans, the Mangyo had the important mission of developing the vast Manchurian natural resources.

In Manchuria, Mangyo's holdings include the Henshu Jidosha K.K. and the Howa Jidosha Kogyo K.K., which accounted for practically all motor vehicle production and repair carried on on the continent. Those companies which were fused on 24 June 1942, are known (to) have been the officially sponsored monopoly of the automobile industry in Manchukuo.

On the mainland of Japan itself, Mangyo's interests include Nissan Jidosha K.K., which has been credited with as high as 40 percent of the motor truck production of Japanese-controlled territory, and the Diesel Jidosha Kogyo K.K., which was designated as the sole producer of motor vehicles powered by Diesel type units, and is credited with about 10 percent of total capacity in Japanese controlled territory. In addition Diesel is also credited with significant tank and tractor manufacturing capacity. Hitachi Seisakusho, which is listed as having some tank capacity, also falls into the Mangyo sphere.¹

1. When the report that Mitsui has taken over the domestic properties of Mangyo is confirmed, the interests described above under Mangyo will be assigned to Mitsui (See Chapter II, p. 59.)

Mangyo dominates these firms by direct ownership of the controlling portion of their stock. Thus in 1941 the Japan Manchukuo Year Book listed them all as direct subsidiaries of the Mangyo, which had stock holdings ranging from 100 percent in the case of Manshu to 20 percent in the case of Hitechi. Its share of Dowa was placed at 57 percent and of Nissan at 29 percent.

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Mangyo's control of the motor vehicle industry was further facilitated, by the circumstances that members of her subsidiary companies formed a substantial majority on the Council of the all-inclusive Automobile Control Society, and together held by far the largest block of shares in the Automobile Distribution Company, which controlled marketing outlets in this field.

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Appendix IIIcAutomobile Industry Control Law

(Law no 33, sanctioned 28 May 1936, and appearing in the Official Gazette, 29 May 1936)

Article 1. The object of this law is to strengthen national defense and promote industrial progress by establishing the automobile manufacturing industry in Japan.

Article 2. Automobile manufacturing industry as the term is used in this law, means industries designated by ordinance, which engage in the assembling or manufacture of automobiles or automobile parts.

Article 3. Persons who wish to engage in the manufacture of automobiles shall obtain a license from the Government, unless the volume of automobiles or automobile parts to be manufactured or assembled is less than a figure to be fixed by ordinance.

The Government shall take into consideration the condition of supply and demand for automobiles and automobile parts and unless it seems that no obstacle to the establishment of the automobile manufacturing industry will result, the Government shall not grant the license mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

Article 4. Persons qualified to receive licenses mentioned in the preceding article, shall be only joint stock companies organized under Japanese law of which more than one-half of the shareholders, more than one-half of the directors, more than one-half the capital, and more than one-half of the voting rights are held by Japanese subjects or juridical persons organized under Japanese law.

The juridical persons mentioned in the preceding paragraph must be juridical persons of which more than one-half of the members, shareholders, or officers in charge or conducting business and more than one-half of the amount of capital or more than one-half of the voting rights are not or do not belong to foreigners or foreign juridical persons.

If a person who has obtained the license mentioned in the preceding article has ceased to possess the qualifications specified in the preceding two paragraphs, the license granted shall be invalidated.

Article 5. An automobile manufacturing company which has obtained a license, mentioned in Article 3, shall commence operations within a period prescribed by the Government.

The Government may grant an extension of the period mentioned in the preceding paragraph only in case it recognizes that there is good reason for so doing.

When an automobile manufacturing company fails to commence operations within the period mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, the license prescribed in Article 3 shall be invalidated.

Article 6. Subject to the provisions of ordinance an automobile manufacturing company shall be exempted from payment of income and business profit taxes on its business operations during the year that the license mentioned in Article 3 is obtained and for a period of five years beginning the year following the year in which that license was obtained.

Article 7. Hokkaido, prefectures, cities, towns, villages, and similar public bodies shall not levy taxes upon the business or on a basis of the capital, employees, manufactured articles, or supplies consumed, motive power used, or income accruing through the operations of an automobile manufacturing company exempted from income tax and business profit tax, under the provisions of the preceding article.

Article 8. When an automobile manufacturing company imports, with the permission of the Government, tools, machinery, or materials necessary to its business, it shall be exempt from the payment of import duties, subject to the provisions of ordinance, for a period of five years from the date of the enforcement of this law.

Article 9. An automobile manufacturing company, when expanding its business may, with the permission of the Government, increase its capital to defray the cost of equipment even though the value of previously issued shares is not fully paid up.

Article 10. An automobile manufacturing company may, with the permission of the Government, issue debentures to an amount beyond the limits prescribed by Article 200 of the Commercial Code in order to defray the cost of installing equipment necessary to the conduct of its business. The total amount of such debentures may not be greater, however, than twice the amount of the company's paid up capital.

If the value of the company's assets, as shown in the last balance sheet, is not as large as its paid up capital, the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply.

Property pertaining to the enterprise of the company must be mortgaged, in accordance with the provisions of the Factory Mortgage Law as security for debentures issued in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this article, unless the Government deems that special circumstances obviate the necessity for such mortgages.

Article 11. If it is feared that the importation of automobiles or automobile parts will interfere with the establishment of the automobile manufacturing industry, the Government may issue orders restricting, for a fixed period, the importation of automobiles or automobile parts.

Article 12. If it is feared that the price of automobiles will be lowered and the establishment of the automobile manufacturing industry interfered with, due to the importation of automobiles or automobile parts, the Government, after submitting the matter to the consideration of the Tariff Investigation Committee, may issue orders providing for the levying of import duties, for a fixed period, on such automobiles or automobile parts of up to fifty percent of the value of those imports, in addition to the import duty thereon specified in the tariff table annexed to the Import Tariff Law.

Article 13. An automobile manufacturing company shall plan its business program to comply with orders -- and shall obtain the sanction of the Government for its business program or the alteration of that program.

The Government may order an automobile manufacturing company to alter its business program if it is deemed necessary.

Article 14. When an automobile manufacturing company wishes to transfer, discontinue, or suspend all or part of its enterprise, it must obtain the permission of the Government, in accordance with the provisions of ordinance.

A resolution to amalgamate or liquidate an automobile manufacturing company is not valid unless the company obtains the permission of the Government in accordance with the provisions of ordinance.

Article 15. The Government may require an automobile manufacturing company to submit a report on its business and financial condition.

The Government may issue necessary supervisory orders to automobile manufacturing companies or take measures in regard to their business affairs or accounts.

In case it is deemed necessary for purposes of supervision, the Government may order the appropriate officials to inspect the offices or place of business, factories, warehouses, or other sites owned by an automobile manufacturing company and to conduct examinations of its business or financial condition, its books and papers, and other matters. Such officials shall be required to carry a certificate indicating their official status.

Article 16. When it is deemed necessary for reasons of public interest, the Government may order an automobile manufacturing company to alter the sale price and the terms of sale of automobiles or automobile parts, or may issue orders on necessary matters with a view to

adjusting the demand and supply of automobiles and automobile parts.

When it is deemed necessary for reasons of public interest, the Government may order an automobile manufacturing company to expand or improve its equipment.

Article 17. When it is deemed necessary for military reasons, the Government may order automobile manufacturing companies to manufacture automobiles or automobile parts for military use, to conduct researches on special matters related to automobiles or to install special equipment, and it may issue orders in regard to other necessary matters connected with military affairs.

Article 18. In granting licenses under Article 3, in fixing limitations under Article 2, or in issuing orders under Article 16, the Government shall submit the matter in advance to the consideration of the Automobile Manufacturing Industry Committee.

Regulations relating to the Automobile Manufacturing Industry Committee shall be determined by Imperial Ordinance.

Article 19. If an automobile manufacturing company infringes the provisions of this law or orders issued under the authorization of this law, or violates the measures adopted in conformity with such orders, or commits acts prejudicial to the public interest, the Government may suspend or restrict its business or cancel the license issued under Article 3 or dismiss its directors or auditors, who perform the functions of directors.

Article 20. Persons coming within the purview of any one of the following categories shall be assessed a fine of not to exceed five thousand yen:

1. A person who, in violation of the provisions of Article 3, has engaged in the manufacture of automobiles without obtaining a license.
2. A person who imported automobiles or automobile parts in violation of the restrictive provisions of Article 11.
3. A person engaged in the manufacture of automobiles who has exceeded the limits (on production) prescribed in Paragraph 4 of the Supplementary Rules.

Article 21. If an automobile manufacturing company has violated the orders issued in accordance with Article 16 or Article 17, the directors or auditors, who perform the functions of directors, shall be assessed a fine of not to exceed three thousand yen each.

1. When a company, in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 13, has carried out its business program without obtaining the permission of the Government.
2. When a company, in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 13, has carried out its business program without alteration.
3. When a company, in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 14, has acted without the permission of the Government in matters requiring such permission.
4. When a company has acted in violation of the orders issued and measures adopted in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Article 15.

Article 23. Persons coming within the purview of any one of the following categories shall be assessed a fine of not to exceed five hundred yen:

1. A person who has failed to file the report provided for in Paragraph 1 of Article 15 or has made a false report.
2. A person who has refused, obstructed, or evaded the inspection or examination by the officials concerned as provided for in Paragraph 3 of Article 15, or has failed to answer the questions of such officials or has made false answers.

Article 24. Automobile manufacturing companies or persons engaged in other businesses related to automobiles may not evade responsibility for any act of their representatives, head, or other members of their family, employees, or other persons connected with their business enterprise, which act is in violation of orders issued in accordance with the provisions of this law, on the ground that such actions were not made under their direction.

Article 25. The penal provisions to be applied in accordance with the provisions of this law or of orders issued in conformity with the provisions of this law shall apply, in case the party to receive the penalty is a juridical person, to directors, managing directors, or other officials in charge of conducting the business of such juridical person; and in case the party to receive such penalty is a minor or a person adjudged incompetent, to his legal representative, unless the minor concerned possesses the same capacity as an adult for the purposes of conduction of a business enterprise.

Additional Rules

The date of enforcement of this law shall be determined by Imperial Ordinance.

Persons who are already engaged in the manufacture of automobiles or have succeeded to such enterprise at the time that this law takes effect, may continue in business, regardless of the provisions of Article 3, for a period of three months from the day when this law takes effect.

If a person, mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has applied for a license under Article 3, within the period mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the provisions of that paragraph shall continue to apply until his application is either accepted or rejected.

Persons who began manufacturing automobiles prior to 9 August 1935, or parties who succeeded to such enterprise and who are conducting such businesses at the time when this law takes effect, may continue to conduct such businesses even after the lapse of the period prescribed in the preceding two paragraphs, regardless of the provisions of Article 3, subject to the provisions of ordinance, within the scale of business conducted by them previous to 9 August 1935.

The provisions of Paragraph 1 and 3 of Article 15 and of Articles 23 to 25 inclusive, shall apply also to parties engaged in the manufacture of automobiles by authorization granted in the preceding paragraph.

If persons who have applied for licenses under Article 3 within a period of one month from the date of the enforcement of this law, import, with the permission of the Government, tools, machinery, or materials necessary in the manufacture of automobiles, they shall be exempted, in accordance with the provision of ordinance, from import duties on such imports for a period of three months from the date of the enforcement of this law.

In case persons who have been exempted from import duties, in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, fail to obtain a license under Article 3, the unpaid duties shall be collected from them.

In cases of exemption from import duties in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 6, the Government may require the deposit of security, at the time of importation, to a value corresponding to the amount of unpaid import duty.

Ref doc 863

極 秘

國 務 省

中間調査及び情報部、研究及び分析課

R. 及 A 第二五五八、三

日本、戰時生産工業

第三部、自動車及戰車生産

記 事

日本、自動車及戰車生産ニ関之ヲ討議
サル。協同組織ニスルコト、從來、政府統制ヲ維
持スルコトヲ一層強調セラル。
本生産ニ関スル能力及技術的方面ニ付テモ
討議サル。

一九四五年十月三十一日

極 秘

No. 1

A. 生産ニ物質的並ニ技術的様相 三. 自動車及戦車工業

一. 般背景

日本、自動車工業ハ一九三六年以前ハ事實上存存シナカシタモノデ、西洋水準ト比較シテ未ダ極度ニ微少ナリ。ソノ總能力ハ各種型車輛年七万乃至九万台ト見積ラレタリ。トランプノ生産又ハトスバ、最近ノ情報ニ依レバ日本ノ自動車年産能力ハ一九四四年ニハ恐ラ一噸半又ハヨリ大型、車輛七万台程度ナリ。同年生産高ハ「トランプ」一萬五千台ト見積ラレタリ。自動車工業ハ戦車、年約三千台、能力ガアツクモノト見積ラレバ（一九四五年一月一日）一九四四年ニハ四百台以下、戦車ガ生産セラレタモノト見積ラレタ。ソノ施設ガヨリ高位ノ優先生産ニ著シク轉換甘シタニモ拘ラズ同工業界ハ明カニ凡ソノ戰時必須要求ヲ果シ得タ「ソノ」心。戰闘ニ於ケル陸軍ノ損失ハ僅クニシテ征服ニヨリ取得物ハ多大ナリ。又國內ノ「トラップ」要求ハ取ルニ足ラヌモノアリ。燃料及ビ修理部ヨリ不足ガ産業輸送ニ於テ「トランプ」ガ重要ナル地位ヲ占ムル如ク「トランプ」ヲ「ソノ」ル。自動車工業ハ恐ラク一九三六年ニ於テ國內、金屬及ビ機械工業、内取モ立通レタ部門ヲ使用自動車、總數ハ十三萬四千

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九十四台ニ過ギナカシタ。三萬ニ至ラ、同工業ハ一九二九年以來著シイ進歩ヲ遂ゲテ来タ。

國內ノ製産ハ少量デアツタ許リデナク又品質カ劣等デアツタ。國內製産ハ約三分ノ二ハ「タットサ」之乗用車ノヨウナ小型乗用車デアツタ。自動車、機關及部令品、八十パーセント以上ハ一九三四年（昭和九年）マデハ米國カラ輸入サレテ来タ。

同時ニ米國ノ諸會社ハ日本ハ青島眞ヲ紹介シテ日本ノ各種生産業者等ニ豫備品及部令品ヲ造ニ契約ヲ結ブ風習ヲ馴致シテ来タ（日本ニ於テ「フォート」ト取引ヲサシタ部令品製造家等ノ覽表ニ関シテハ附屬文書百一一甲参照、コト）。

戰車生産ハ極ウ少量デアツタ爲「トラック」ノ部令品及組立設備ニ影響スルトコロカシタ。

一九四四年ニハ日本ハ「トラック」及戰車、他ニ二萬台ノ自動自轉車、八百台ノ附屬車及二百台ノ「トラック」ヲ製造シタト概算サレテ来ル。

第四及五表ハ各々「トラック」及自動車ノ製造發展狀況ヲ要約ミテ来ル。第四表ハ又「トラック」全般ノ狀態ヲ示スト同時ニ最近ニ於ケル生産資料ヲ示サントスルモノデアル第五表ハ右草ヲ示スニ過ギナイデアル。一九四四年ノ車輛製産水準ニ達スルタメ日本ハ約十五万ノ勞働力ヲ其方面ニ向ケテ来タノデアル（R及A三七一日本人口ノ産業配置参照）

No. 3

二、軍部ニ對スル重要性

(4) 一、軍ノ獎勵

日本、國產自動車工業確立へ、接近ハ經濟ニ基クモ、テナク、國防ノ理由ハ費用ニ構ハズ新比手彼ヲ要求スルハ云フ日本政府、意見ニ基クモ、デアツク、國家的誇リモ含メテ居テ、自動車ハ擴大スル軍手事力ノ爲缺クカラサル必需品ト考ヘラレタ。日本陸軍ハ純然タル日本ノ自動車工業促進ニ關シテハ政府、方針、最モ有力ナ熱心ヲ支持者デアツク。日本ハ凡ソ、外國ノ貨物自動車製造業者ノ支配ヲ脱シテ自立ニナケバナラナイト主張シタ。

第四表

三一・一七三

日本軍占領地域ニ於テ貨物自動車狀況

(單位一千台)

年	登錄	新生産	輸入	占領地域	消耗
一九二九	二三・四	二	一四・三	* 一一	一〇・三
一九三〇	二七・六	四	一〇・〇	* 一一	五・四
一九三一	三三・六	五	九・一	* 一一	六・七

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一九三二	三六五	一	六六	*—	六二
一九三三	三六六	一六	六三	*—	六二
一九三四	三六三	一九	一三九	—	一〇二
一九三五	四四九	一八	一三八	—	八八
一九三六	五二九	三〇	一三八	—	八六
一九三七	六〇一	五〇	一六五	五〇	六五
一九三八	七九九	八〇	一三七	五〇	三三
一九三九	八三四	一五〇	一〇九	五〇	一七四
一九四〇	九六九	二〇〇	八	四〇	一〇五
一九四一	一一二	一五〇	*—	一三七	一八八
一九四二	一二三	二〇〇	*—	五〇二	二六〇
一九四三	一六七三	二〇〇	*—	一〇	二八九
一九四四	五九四	一五〇			

*五百台以下

No. 5

第五表

日本自動車工業、發達

一九二九 — 一九三六

年	國內生産	輸入	輸出	輸入	輸出
一九二九	四三七	二九、三三八	—	—	—
一九三〇	四五一	一五、六七八	—	—	—
一九三一	四三四	二〇、一〇九	—	—	—
一九三二	八四〇	一四、〇八七	—	—	—
一九三三	一、六一二	一五、〇八二	—	—	—
一九三四	二、七〇一	三三、四五八	—	—	—
一九三五	五、三五五	三〇、七八七	—	—	—
一九三六(昭和十一年)	九、六三三	三〇、九八九	—	—	—

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No. 7

多額政府補助金、輸入税、引上、及び外國自動車製造業者ニ對スル生産制限、助ケニ依ツテ國內自動車工業が確立サレニツ、會社が一九四二年頃迄三年生産約六萬台、乗用及び貨物自動車生産、目標ヲ記サレタ。日本ニ於テ外國ヨリ、供給ニ頼ルヨリモ寧ロ日本産自動車ヲ好ミ、唯一、消費者群デ、軍部ハ、乗用車ニハ關心ヲ持タナカッタ、又輸出品市場ニハ關心ヲ持タナカッタ、貨物自動車ノ型、變化ヤ外觀ニハ關心ヲ持タナカッタ、デアル。軍部ハ最も狭イ意味ニ於テ總然タル軍事的必要、観点カラ此、問題ヲ考ヘテ居タ、デアル。

ニ 政府補助金及び関税

日本ニ製造サレル自動車ハ政府、援助デ、シテ殆ト販賣不能デアッタ。軍部ニ製造サレルトラックハ政府、補助金制度、基礎ニ立ツテ生産サレ政府が生産サレタ大部分ヲ買上、殘餘ハ民間商社ニ補助金ヲ下附シテ、之ヲ買上ゲサセタ。例ヘバ戦争直前ニ於テ政府ハ、一五メートルトン型、六輪 軍用自動車一台ニ就テ三百圓、補助金ヲ支給シタ。日本、生産者ニトツテ戦前、日本、小市場向ケ、標準型

自動車一台ヲ作ルニ約八千圓ヲ要シ。
三種、アメリカ製自動車、部分品ヲ組合セ
テ作ラレタ、トヨタトシ、ハ、四千五百圓至
廣ク一般ニ販賣カレタ、テアル。

日本側、傳ヘル所ニ依ルハトヨタトシ、
一台、販賣ニハ三千五百圓、損ガアタト
カラシメ、又此賣、相異ラ無視セタ、
ナリカ、生産者、自由競争ガ不可能ナ
リタ、事ハ明瞭ナリ。事實一八九三年

度、輸入税ハ自動車ノ大部分品双ナニ
カケラレタ、四千九百トニ至タトハ此從
價税ト同ジテタツ。一一一、一七六、

三、自動車ニ對スル空、依存
概シテ日本軍隊ハ合衆國或ハ歐洲主
要列強、何レ、國ノ軍隊ヨリモ、戰車ニ

自動車ニ依存スル事カ割合ニ甚タカシ。
比較編成表、要求量ハ、一九四三年度ニ於テ
ハ日本軍裝甲師團ハ、合衆國裝甲師

團、有テ此略々五倍、一、戰車、狼逸及也
英國、裝甲師團、有テ此三分、一、僅カ五
超工ル戰車ヲ擁スル、ミデアル事ヲ指示
シタ。從テ、日本兵師團ニ對スル稀散表

要求量ハ、倍カシタ。狼逸、一師團(一五)

11. 8

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三七九人)が、一一二二台、自動車ト「トス」
 及び三五八台、「オートバイ」ヲ所有セル一
 方、日本、歩兵一個師團(二万人)ハ僅
 カニ六十台、自動車ト「トス」及び二十台
 「オートバイ」ニカ持ツナカシク。

故ニ日本、自動車並ビニ戦車、裝備ハ
 諸他、列強、規模ヲ遙カニ下廻ルモノ
 ナリ。

第ニ表ハ、日本軍、諸種、車、見積保
 有量ヲ示シテ在ル。

第ニ表
 概略 日本軍裝備現勢
 (一九四五年一月一日)

	編成諸師團		前線車數、總計	
	保有車數		%ト示サレタル	
			總司令部準備	
輕戰車	四	〇〇〇	一	〇
中戰車	二五	〇〇	一	〇
裝甲車	三	〇〇	一	〇
自動貨車	〇	〇〇〇	一	五
				八〇五〇〇

No. 9

部外種

三、産業業經濟ニ對スル重要性

日本ハ輸送ニ對シテハ常ニ西洋諸國、何
レノ國ヨリモ自動車ニ依存スルコトガ非常ニ

少ナカシク、例之一九三八年ノ初メニ於テ、

アメリカ合衆國ハ三八名、英國ハ八一名、

独乙ハ一八六名ニ對シテ一台、割テ、

ニ日本ハ一七〇名ニ對シテ荷物自動車只

集合自動車ガ平均一台、割テ、

日本ニ次グ最下位ニテハ伊太利、歐聯ヲ

工モ一人當リ、約二倍、荷物自動車又ハ

集合自動車ヲ持ソテ居テ。

日本ハ輸送ニ對シテハ元來其、優劣ナ

鐵道組織及ビ水運輸送機關ニ依存

シテ居ル。日本ノ或地方ハ、人力車及ビ牛

馬車ガ廣範圍ニ利用サレ居ル。更ニ又慢

用サレテ居ル自動車ハ集約ニ利用サレテ

居テ、アメリカ、標準ニミレハ極度ニ過剩

積載ヲシテ居ル。鐵道及ビ船舶輸送ハ、

此ノ依存ハ或部分ハ、如キ數種、經

濟的要素ニシテ。

1. 狭ナル内國市場

日本ノ利益ヲ原價、立場ニシテ場合ガ

No. 10

Def. 1900 863

11.11

Ref Doc 863

アメリカ力様式ノ標準型自動車製造ノミ
ナラズ「ダットサン」即チ小型自動車製造
ニモ適用サレル實際的ニ言ハバ日本市場
ニ於テハ日本ノ小型自動車ニ關スル外國ノ
競争者ハ存在シテカッタ。英國製ノ「
ビー・オー・ス・ライン」/English Baking Machine
及ビ英國製ノ「ベビー・フー・ド」/English Baby
「ハッダットサン」ハ少量シカ賣レテカッタ。然シ此等
「ダットサン」ヨリハ品質ガ遙カニ優秀デ
アッタ。然シ日本人ハ「ダットサン」ト同様
ノ廉價デアツチモ小型自動車ハ喜ンデ
購入シヨウトハシヤカッタ。相當大市場ヲ
獲得スルニハ一千圓ヨリ余程以下デ販賣
サレババ「ラナカッタ」ガソレデハ製造家ニ
恐ラクニ千圓以上ノ損失ヲ一台ニ付キ蒙
ラセル事ニナッタ。日本ノ自動車工場ノ少
タイ生産量ガ製造原價高ノ主要ナル
原因デアル。

在勞力、材料及工作機械費用。勞力費用用自動
車之組立。而日本更以此居於唯一重要者。此殆以
輸入之材料及已經最近運輸入者。其工作機械、
朱國之毛日本、亦為高價之品。之故。日本、自動車
工業促進法、一九三六年、法律下、於其真實之工
法律輸入稅、免除此項之低價材料及工作機
械費用減額之法。過去、日本、製造業者、上
上本國、自動車工場、重要、特色、高價特殊、
工作機械、比出金、掛、工廠、設備、
費用、比較、的、同、時、二、工場、機械、的、能率、低、
言、日本、勞力、比較、的、總、較、工、作、機、械、が、自由市場、
於、日本、製造業、家、收、受、償、補、經、常、得、此、所、近、生、產、費、
從、下、得、而、上、カ、今、後、問題、云、ハ。

(一) 日本、米國技術使用、理念、の補助金問題、米國自
動車、スリ、模倣、化、より、起、ル、日本、製造業、者、何、れ、特
許權侵害關係、通過、云、ハ、日本、自動車製造業、
者、達、を、米國、車、に、特、許、得、可、ク、思、フ、時、ハ、何時、ニ
日本、特、許、法、其、特、許、を、廢、止、セ、バ、日本、語、讀、ム、ハ
梯、外國人、居住、地、ヲ、名、メ、テ、新、聞、ニ、表、サ、レ、
ト、適用、シ、タ、格、ナ、ク、明、カ、ニ、日、本、政、府、ニ、取、リ、重、要
モノ、と、稱、ス、於、テ、特、許、制、限、失、テ、手、續、ヲ、許、シ

五〇九

技術方面

工具、能力、自動、車、部、門、於、以、基、本、的、製、造、工、程

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2. 原料ニツクニ、ニツクニ鉄、
特殊鋼、アルミニウム、生棉及び護謨等、
如キ必要欲フベカラザル物ガ含まレテイタ。可
成大量ノ此等原料ガ長キ期間保藏カシ
テ居タト云ヒテ中ニ、ニツクニ、供給大部分加
率院ニ直接ニ商接ニ得ラタニ、此等、独逸、通商
特殊鋼、大部分ヲ供給ス。昭和十二年、日
本、英領馬來ヨリ七割ノ護謨ヲ輸入セリ、
大部分、蘭領東印度及英領馬來ヨリ
供給サレタ。

戰時狀態ニ依リ、日本ハ元素主要原料
一、特ニ齒輪、齒輪子軸等、如キ重要
自動車部分、製造ニ必要ト高級合
金鋼、缺乏、為テ二國難ヲ感シタラシムガ
……戰時中、新ニ設備、技術、發達
會、且ツ底流ヲ代用品、使用ニ依リテ
……狀態、改善ヲ明カニ計シタ。

鐵及鐵

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戰前日本其鐵鐵道建設及製鐵業之九割、輸入鐵鐵、依存する年、需無屑鉄、大部分を亦主として、合衆國より輸入して居る。
戰前中國國、鉄鋼事業は殆ど全部大陸に産する鉄鐵、及炭、石炭、に依存する年。
一九四三年、滿洲、朝鮮、菲律賓、及、馬來、其重要性、順序で、國に所需、鉄鐵、供給した。
豫算する一九四四年度、日本本土に於ける製鋼工場、実生産能力は一千二百萬噸に達するが、其能力の常生産高は遙かに超えて、一九四四年、日本自身に依つて計畫する生産量を二百萬噸に超えたいと云ふ程で、一九四五年、第一期は、一層顯著なる減少を來し、程で、船舶、積出困難、空襲、が根本に及ぶ、如き趨勢、トナリ、一九四四年に於ける能力と生産と、差は、如き大なり、現れて、一九四四年、數字、三百萬噸、の戰前、日本、需要、鋼生産高、總量、(三百萬噸)より、遠く、隔た、る年、ナリ、デアル。
一九四三年、日本、生産、七、四、五、五、百、萬、噸、鉄、鉄、及、多分、同等、量、の、鑄、鉄、及、鑄、鉄、生産物、中、約、二、五、萬、噸、也、或、ハ、其、六、分、より、少、量、の、自動車、及、戰車、製造、に、振、り、當、て、ら、れ、デ、アル。

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一、地方集中 鉄鋼産業ハ二三、重要地域ニ著しく集中する、(東京、横浜、戸田、八幡、及、滿洲、鞍山)

十地域ハ六パーセント、銑鉄製造能力、九十四パーセント
 製鋼能力及、九パーセント、伸鉄製品製造能力
 引受ケテナル其製鉄業、特徴トスル処ハ二三、設
 備完全ナ大工場ト多ク、小二場トデアル 三最大工場
 ハ三〇五パーセント、製銑能力ニ六二パーセント、製鋼能力
 ト二二パーセント、伸鉄製品製造能力ヲ引受ケテナル

(附屬文書一一乙参照)

二選擇的国内工程 砂鉄、需要トスルモ拘ラズ製鋼ニ適
 切ナル分析ニ依ル鉄、製産ニ附随スル困難ト云フ見地
 ヲ以テ是等資源源ハ量的ニ重要ナラト考ヘテナリ多

數、少規模国内製造者ニ依ッテ若干、鉄ガ砂鉄カラ造
 る。然レ僅カ二十五万吨、鉄銑或ハ約十万吨、伸鉄
 製品ヲ造ルニ足ルガハ此方格ニ依ルモナラニ 此、ヨシニ
 狭ク範圍、成功テハアルカ併シ此、方面ニ於テ將來發
 展スルカモ知シナイコトヲ示スモノナラニ

三貯藏堆積品 終戰當時ニ於テ鋼鉄、半製造、實
 質的貯藏集積カ若干ナリトモ日本ニ存在シテナク言
 フ事ハ有り得ナイナラニ 從ッテ若シ戰時中如何
 ナ時期ニ於テモ生産カ消費ニ超過シタトスル貯
 藏品ハ恐ラク末端製造者ニシタデアラク 銑鉄、貯
 藏品ハ銑鉄、液入ト鋼鉄溶鋸炉ノ消費ニ依ッテ決定
 デラレモナラニ 日本、海運業ニ於ケル危機、タメニ終
 戰當時ニハ日本ニ於テ延長セシ供給妨害ヲ持越スニ充
 分ナ手段ハ多ク存在シタカニナラニ

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..... エソ、能カラ購フ
 為メ日本トシテハ滿洲、中國、朝鮮、比、津、濱、又、三、島
 末、限ラシタ鉄、鋳、石、資、源ニ甚タシク頼ミヤトシバテラ
 ナカッタデアル。日本、鉄、鋼、工、業、ハ、最、初、リ、^{註一}日本
 本、ニ、於、ケル、最、モ、甚、タ、シ、ク、補、助、金、ヲ、受、ケ、タ、工、業、ニ、ツ、テ、ア、ッ、タ
 之、ハ、主、ト、シ、テ、コ、リ、ウ、区、出、炭、モ、鋳、石、モ、其、ニ、輸、入、セ、ヨ、バ、テ、ラ、ナ、カ、ッ、タ
 シ、又、極、速、ニ、於、テ、得、ラ、レ、ル、最、モ、近、距離、ノ、鋳、石、ハ、主、ト、シ、テ、鉄
 含有量平均三五乃至四五パーセント、低級鋳石デアル為
 デアルタ。

註一 一九三七乃至一九四三年、日本ニ於ケル鋼鉄工業ニ補
 助金ハ三億五千三百三十九万五千円ニ達シタ。
 同期間ノ石炭鋳業ハ七億九千九十二万八千円受ケタ。

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自動車、生産官制部、補助金、支給、之ヲ設
勵、一九三二年、日本、汽車、自動車工業、確立、研究
ニ、本國、合、設、一九三四年、自動車工業、對
ニ、國策樹立方法、討論、爲、陸軍、海軍、鐵道、
内務、商工、外務、大藏、拓務、各府及内閣、資源、局、後、官
署、成、各有、連合會議、設、此、各有、連合會議、工
業、統製、對、其、基本、計畫、作、之、一九三五年、八月、九
日、簽、且、自動車工業統製法、每、作成、同法
案、一九三六年、四月、二十八日、閣議、承認、此、法
律、外國、之、統製、之、製造、業、擴、大、防止、企圖
ニ、輸入、徵稅、割、割、其、基礎、依、又、此、法律
「日本、或、合、獨、製造、認可、與、之、生産、對、政
府、監督、代、認可、之、合、幾、多、特、等、之、特、權
ヲ、與、之、中、日本、自動車工業、實、質、的、獨、自、之、特
權、ト、之、キ、ナ、ク、(全文、就、附、錄、三、ノ、參、照、之、一、
九三二年、五月、十九日、附、官、報、發、表、之、通、リ、) 此、法、案
ノ、本、質、的、特、徵、日本、人、原、之、也、次、通、リ、。

(1) 自動車工業統制法

(一) 本法目的

本法、目的、國、之、完成、之、遂、之、産業、發、展、ヲ、達成、爲、

自動車製造工業ヲ日本、確立、セ、ト、ス、ル、ニ、在、リ、。

(二) 免許制

政府、定、之、一定、限度、以上、政府、ノ、命令、依、リ、設計、シ、

自動車、之、組、立、ニ、有、及、政府、依、リ、設計、シ、之、自動車部

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(三) 特權

1. 免許を許可せしむる会社(一定期間或は種、税を免除せしむる。

2. 運賃を一定の割合で減額し、自動車製造会社に便宜を與へ、或は特別優待の措置を講ずることを。

(四) 公益保護

1. 政府は自動車製造会社に一定の必要を何時も生ずる管理及び公益、福祉増進、多大の利益を見做るに如き命令を發せしむる權限を有する。

2. 政府は國防上必要と見做るに如き命令を發する權限を有する。

(五) 自動車及び部品の輸入取扱い

輸入自動車及び輸入自動車部品の、價格が我が國に於ける自動車製造工業、發達に阻害を及ぼす結果を生じたるに依り、廉下と認められたる時に、政府は、輸入自動車及び其の部品、輸入を禁止し、或は之を對する関税増徴を高く得べし。

(六) 自動車製造工業委員會

自動車製造工業委員會は自動車製造会社、認可し、不実施行の事項を有する目的を組織せしむる。

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(七) 溯及的條項
本法規定サレタル如ク、一九三五年八月九日以前ニ自動車製造
業ヲ開始セシ者及ビ本法施行ノ時ニ尙同業ニ従事セシ者ハ
前述ノ認可ヲ得有セシテ該業務ヲ繼續ヨリ行ハルベシ。
但シ一九三五年八月九日以前、事業ヲ範圍内ニ限ラズベシ。

自動車産業統制法より自動車、制鐵造及組立、
政府、許可、下、二、外、ハ、同、下、於、此、主要、被、許可、者、
横濱、日産自動車株式会社及び磐井（愛知縣）、
本田自動車株式会社等、所謂一般型自動車
及び貨物自動車、大量生産工場として政府認可、
戦前、兩工場、各々年産一三、五〇〇台、制鐵造ヲ許可
サレタ。

同時三分の一、全社八第産一六三六〇台、製造して割当
して、エスエルエーターズ全社九、四七〇台、製造して割当して、
此の、割当は過去三年、平均生産高より算出
され、これ、割当、下二乗用車及び化油器自動車、何れも之
輸入され、下二、一九八二年末以後、乗用車の営業量
用二輸入と製造とが一致する。輸入され、アメリカ製化油器
自動車、大部分は日本電器製造局、東京、東京、

日論見、計画を維持せし爲に、又日産及豊田、発展、
成功及、外国爲替、不足、結果として日本当局、ニツケル由

22 組合工場ニ對シテ輸入許可證ハ多量に進口的に減少シテ、
一九三九年ニ到リ得ズルモノトシテ、ハ實際的に生産不能ナリシ。
「フォード」ハ非常に減少セラレタ聲デ工業ヲ多量に壓シタガ。

一九四〇年二月末に閉鎖、止むべきに至る。

一九四二年一月、三月間日本、支那、香港、上海、

滿洲洲自動車株式會社に使用せしむる積立金、滿洲洲、

安東、其、總、設備、積立金、梅收、工場、

其、物、三菱會社に所有せし、大型船舶、船、船、

艦、用、其、北、発、動、機、此、旧、工、場、工、場、工、場、

同様、其、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、

自動車株式會社に積出せしむる、其、設備、

與、其、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、

確、定、す、る、に、

二、國、東、會、社

「其、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、

基、本、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、

一、制、造、業、者、指、定、工、場、工、場、工、場、

カ、其、建、定、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、

見、除、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、

元、利、金、係、証、附、工、場、工、場、工、場、

セ、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、

イ、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、

生、産、業、者、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、

東、京、自、動、車、工、業、株、式、會、社、工、場、

建、定、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、

立、寄、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、

車、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、工、場、

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自動車製造業は、自産及消費の増進を目的とし、運輸自動車製造業に關し、自動車工業管理法により一九三六年同様の規定を受けた。

一他、前記のソレが示せる、自動車より再編セラレタ言ハテナル。又亦滿洲自動車工業工場（向テ船積セラレタトモ傳ヘラレル。

（イ）管理

一軍需省

一九四三年、終リ必キ自動車工業ニ對シ政府に管理ハ商工省ニ依リテ行ハレタキ。然レ上記商工省機能、他ト共取ツテ。

一九四三年十一月、軍需省が成立セラルト同時ニ自動車工業ニ關スル一般權限ハ、令野ニ於テ運営サレタモト思ハレル。

同時ニ創立セラル、林運輸通信省機能カラ自動車生産ニ對スル統制が特ニ除外サレタナル、コノ事ハ一層ソレ思ハレ勝タル。

陸軍兵器本部及ビ種々陸軍兵器廠、自工場又ハ直接管理セル工場能ハタツタ、及ビ裝束甲車、生産ニ對シ權限ヲ保留シタキ。然レ自動車工業一般生産計畫ハ軍需省、

一課カラ出サレタタリ、關係セル特別、半官貿易機關ニヨリ管理サレタナル。

一九四五年夏、初期ニ日本約政ニヨリ行ハレタ運輸完全再編成、線ニヨリテ自動車及シ他、小荷物運送ニ對シ

統制ハ運輸省及軍需省カラ陸軍兵器本部（陸軍省）ニ引渡サレタ。コノ統制ハ自動車、事實ニ生産及維持

ニ及ビタ。

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二 自動車統制令 官官企業聯合

自動車工業、場合一が、八、列へ、原料、注文、配分、後、十、生産、細部、可、実行、之、組織、ハ、一九四一年九月一日、重要、産業、本、國、府、令、ニ、從、フ、ヲ、設、立、サ、レ、タ、自動車統制令、ヲ、此、此、法、令、ニ、從、フ、ヲ、自動車、ノ、生産、配、分、附、屬、品、ノ、生産、配、分、及、之、維持、ハ、一、互、任、団、體、ノ、下、ニ、置、カ、レ、タ、ヲ、此、ヲ、三、ノ、組織、體、又、日本、自動車、製造、業、組、合、及、多、分、全、國、自、動、車、組、合、工、業、組、合、聯、合、會、ヲ、引、進、ス、之、等、ハ、共、ニ、以、テ、日本、及、他、南、方、地、域、ニ、於、テ、自、動、車、ノ、部、分、配、分、及、之、附、屬、品、ノ、生産、配、分、及、之、統、制、ヲ、一、格、統、制、シ、テ、處、リ、タ、ル、此、ノ、経、路、ヲ、通、ジ、テ、凡、ソ、ノ、相、互、製造、業、及、本、國、各、種、部、分、由、ノ、生産、配、分、計、ハ、此、ノ、計、画、ヲ、受、ク、ヲ、居、タ、ル、

ノ、機能、能、ヲ、示、シ、年、此、

總務

企劃

生産

配給

技術

規程及
説明

ノ、公、的、性、格、ハ、高、級、軍、人、及、官、僚、ヲ、首、腦、部、ニ、任、命、ス、ル、ト、シ、依、リ、テ、決、ス、ル、之、然、レ、テ、下、リ、理、事、長、ノ、大、部、會、ハ、本、業、業、界、ノ、發、展、ヲ、主、ス、ル、斯、ノ、ヲ、會、長、ハ、常、務、外、交、官、ニ、テ、參、謀、本、部、員、陸、軍、中、將、鈴木、重、康、ノ、リ、理、事、長、ハ、前、述、ノ、省、燃、料、同、課、長、ノ、若、手、大、隊、長、及、後、衛、部、門、長、ノ、リ、鈴木、英、雄、ノ、リ、タ、リ、

理、事、長、中、ノ、一、人、當、面、自、動、車、ノ、取、得、後、同、課、長、三、人、居、タ、リ、

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自動車統制會（評議會）開會報告

次評議員及其會社名

豐田 喜一郎

豐田自動車會社社長

村上 正輔

日產自動車會社社長

林 桂

七七七自動車

下田 文吉

川崎車輛會社專務取締役

山本 惣治

滿洲自動車會社社長日產

自動車會社取締役

淺原 源七

日產自動車會社專務取締役

寺田 甚吉

日本内燃機

野長瀬 忠男

車輪工業

手ノりミシン

ミシン工業組合

東京帝國大學三教授、田中茅雄、三島

徳一モ評議員加テ居テ、此自動車統制會、監督者モ本

大會社、者テ、即チ豐田自動車會社、赤井久義、日

產自動車會社、ミシン工業、ト、ミシン工業、

此會、次、事項ヲスル為ニ組織サレモテ、

生産擴充、資材、動員、製造、生産並ニ生産對ニ、原

料供給ニ關スル報告、檢討、

個々會員、適當、人的資源、適當、割當、資

ニ對スル要求ヲ處理スル、又大東亞共榮圈自動車企

業ヲ設立ス、

日本、滿洲、中國、及ニ南洋地域ヲ以テ、一、統制スル資材

生産、及ニ各地域ニ於テ、供給ニ對スル、基礎的計畫、

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樹立せし此、企業、産業、各部門、對、生産計畫
ヲ研究シ、生産擴充ニ必要ナル設備、量、確
定ス、バ、自動車工業、經營規模、及、運用方法、研
究ヲ行ハシ。

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亦投資ノカギニテ滿洲ニ
於テ北莫大ノ天然資源ヲ開發スル重要ナル使命ヲ擔フイサ
滿洲ニ於テハ滿洲特殊ニ大陸ヲ行ハシムルニシテ全部ノ自動車
製造及修理ヲ引受ケテ滿洲自動車株式會社及同和自
動車工業株式會社ヲ含ム
昭和十七年六月十四日ニ統合シテノ諸會社ハ滿洲國ニ於テ自
動車工業ノ公行ハシテ獨占ヲ行ハシ知ラセ居ル
日本本土ニ於テハ滿洲特殊ニ日本管理領内ニ於テ貨物
自動車ノ四割ヲ生産シ居ルニ是故ニ日本自動車株式
會社ト稱シテ「型」機關ノ動力トナル自動車ノ主要製造所
指定シ日本管理領内ニ於テ全能力ノ一割ヲ持ツ
各ルニ見做ラシメ「型」自動車工業株式會社ヲ含ム
更ニ「型」ハ入相當ノ單車及牽引車ノ製造能力ヲ持
テ居ルニ見做ラシメ「型」ノ戰車能力有リト表シ記入サレリ日
立製造所モ亦滿洲國内ニ入リ
註三 三井物産業、國內戰產ヲ受継グモノハ報告ヲ確證
サレバ上記滿洲特殊ニ三井ニ譲渡サレリ
(第二章、五十九頁参照)
(以下次頁、)

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四、五九

部外秘

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滿業定會社其株式支配的部令直接所有
 下依之支配之居。斯クシテ一九四一年三月滿年
 經定會社其滿業直接從屬會社手記載之居
 1. 滿業滿洲聯合一百%日立、聯合二十%
 三北株式所有之居、又同和株式十七%日產
 株式九%之居、又十七%。

x x x x
 x x x x

滿業從屬會社、社員全自動車統制組合會議
 於此會議的大多數之居、其此種所有
 之株式數路統制之居、自動車配給會社、株
 式大部分之所有之居、其事情之依、滿業自
 動車產業三株式支配、一層客司之居、其此。

1403b

タルトモ、許可、其、效力ヲ失フ

3 才五條 第三條、許可、受ケル会社(自動車製造

86 会社)政府指定ニ期間内ニ、事業ヲ開始ス

政府、正當ノ事由ヨリ、該、会社ニ限、前項、期間、延長

190 才許可、タルトモ、得、自動車製造会社前三條、期間内ニ、

事業ヲ開始ス、タルトモ、才三條、許可、其、效力ヲ失フ

才六條 自動車製造会社、命令、定ル所ニ依、才三條、

190 許可、受ケル年及、一、四年ヨリ、五年間、事業、何所

得税及、営業收益税、免除ス

才七條 北海道、府縣及、市町村、他、是ニ準、タガ、ハ、

前條、規定、依、所得税及、営業收益税、免除セ、ル

ル自動車製造会社、ハ、免除セ、ル事業、三、年、又、

ノ、免除セ、ル事業、ニ、屬、スル資本金額、從業者、營業所

ノ、工作物、或、物件、使用動力、又、收入、標準、ト、シ、課税、セ、

ル、得、

才八條 自動車製造会社、事業、ニ、必要、ナル器具、機

械、又、材料、政府、認可、受ケ、輸入、タルトモ、本法施行、日ヨリ

五年間、命令、定ル所ニ依、輸入税、免除ス

才九條 自動車製造会社、事業、擴張、爲、合、於、政府

ノ、許可、受、ケ、事業、ニ、屬、スル設備、使用、ニ、充、ル、爲、保、全

金額、拂、込、前、ト、雖、モ、資本、増、加、セ、ル、コ、ト、ヲ、得

32 才十條 自動車製造会社、政府、認可、受、ケ、事

190 業、ニ、屬、スル設備、使用、ニ、充、ル、爲、商、法、才、二、條、規定

ニ、依、リ、制限、ヲ、超、ス、社、債、ヲ、募集、ス、ル、コ、ト、ヲ、得、但、シ、社

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才十二條 政府軍事上必要ナルト認ムルモ自動車製造會社ニ對シ軍用自動車又ハ其部外品ノ製造自動車ニ關スル特殊事項、研究又ハ特殊設備施設、他軍事上必要ナル事項ヲ命令スルヲ得
才十一條 政府若シテ、許可、才十一條ノ制限又
才十六條 命令ヲ付シテ久シキ自動車製造事業
委員會、議ヲ經ベシ
自動車製造事業委員會ニ關スル規程ハ勅令ヲ以テ之ヲ定ム
才十九條 自動車製造會社本法定ハ本志ニ基キテ從テ命令又ハ之ニ基キテ序又処分ニ違反スルハ公益ニ害スル行為ヲナシタルトキ、政府ハ其義務ヲ停止スルハ制限ニ、才三條ノ許可ヲ取消スルハ取締後、行フ職務ヲ行フ監督後、解任ヲ順序スルヲ得
才二十條 左ノ各号ノ一ニ該當スルモハ、五月五、四附會ヲ經テ
一才三條ノ規定ニ違反シ許可ヲ受ケタル自動車製造事業ヲ營ミタル者
二才十一條ノ規定ニ依リ、制限ニ違反シ自動車又ハ自動車ノ部品、輸入ヲ爲ミタル者
三附則第四項ニ掲グルモノニテ同項ノ規定ニ依リ範圍ヲ經テ自動車製造事業ヲ營ミタルモノ
才三十一條 自動車製造會社才二十六條又才三十一條

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命令ニ違反スルモノ、取締役又ハ職務ヲ行
ス監査役ヲ三十円以下、罰金ニ処ス

オ十三條 自動車製造会社左ノ各号、ニ該當スル
トキハ、取締役又ハ職務ヲ行フ監査役ヲ十
円以下、罰金ニ処ス

一オ十三條オ一項ノ規定ニ違反シ認可ヲ受ケザル
事業計畫ヲ実施シタルトキ

二オ十三條オ二項ノ命令ニ違反シ事業計畫ヲ変
更セシメ之ヲ実施シタルトキ

三オ十四條オ一項ノ規定ニ依リ許可ヲ受ケル事業
ヲ許可ヲ受ケテ行フ爲メニタルトキ

四オ十五條オ二項ノ命令又ハ処分ニ違反シタルトキ
オ十三條 左ノ各号、ニ該當スル者ハ五百円以下、
罰金ニ処ス

一オ十五條オ一項ノ規定ニ依リ報告ヲ爲サズ又ハ定
後ノ報告ヲ爲セタル者

二オ十五條オ三項ノ規定ニ依リ当該官吏ノ臨検檢
査ヲ拒ミ妨ケ若ハ忌避シ又ハソノ傾向ニ對シ答弁
ヲ爲サズ若ハ定後ノ陳述ヲ爲セタル者

オ十四條 自動車製造会社ソノ他、自動車ニ関スル
管業者ハソノ代理人、主、家族、雇人、ソノ他、從
業者カソノ業務ニ関シ本法若ハ本法ニ基キテ發スル
命令又ハ之ニ基キテ發スル処分ニ違反シタルトキ、自己

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ヲ受ケルコトヲ得

オ十五條オ一項オ三項及ニオ二十三條乃至オ二十五條ノ規定ニ於テ、規定ニ依リ自動車製造事業ヲ営ム者ニ之ヲ準用ス

本法施行、日ヨリ一月以内ニオ三條ノ許可ヲ申請スル者自動車製造事業ノ爲ニ必要ナル器具、機械又ハ材料ヲ政府ノ許可ヲ受ケ輸入スルニ依リ輸入税ヲ免除ス

オ六項ノ規定ニ依リ輸入税ノ免除ヲ受ケタル者オ三條ノ許可ヲ受ケルニ至ラザルトテハ、其ノ輸入税ヲ追徴ス

オ六項ノ規定ニ依リ輸入税ノ免除ヲ受ケタル者ニ於テハ輸入ノ際税金ニ相当スル担保ヲ提供シムコトヲ得